Showing 1 - 10 of 27
Economic agents care about their relative well-being, and the comparisons are usually local. We capture this using a network model, in which an agent's payoff depends on the ranking of their allocation among their network neighbors’. Given a network, an allocation is called α-stable if no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536951
This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010
games and to pillage games to illustrate the consequences of imposing rational expectations for farsighted stability. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010011
We investigate a normative theory of incomplete preferences in the context of preliminary screening procedures. We introduce a theory of ranking in the presence of objectively incomparable marginal contributions (apples and oranges). Our theory recommends benchmarking, a method under which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010033
induce hedonic games that admit core-stability. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010047
I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010052
by establishing non-emptyness results for all finite games as well as transferable utility partition function games. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215314
I develop two related solution concepts, equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior, which capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189002
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a …, at least in part because the existing definition (for games with more than two players) consists of an ad hoc scheme that …, and computational formula-to Bayesian games. We then apply the value in simple models of corruption, oligopolistic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189026
Strategy-proofness (SP) is a sought-after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy-proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189078