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Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons

Cheng, Chen; Xing, Yiqing - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1473-1499

Economic agents care about their relative well-being, and the comparisons are usually local. We capture this using a network model, in which an agent's payoff depends on the ranking of their allocation among their network neighbors’. Given a network, an allocation is called α-stable if no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536951

Stability in repeated matching markets

Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010

Rational expectations and farsighted stability

Dutta, Bhaskar; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1191-1227

games and to pillage games to illustrate the consequences of imposing rational expectations for farsighted stability. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010011

Benchmarking

Chambers, Christopher P.; Miller, Alan D. - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 485-504

We investigate a normative theory of incomplete preferences in the context of preliminary screening procedures. We introduce a theory of ranking in the presence of objectively incomparable marginal contributions (apples and oranges). Our theory recommends benchmarking, a method under which an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010033

Rationing rules and stable coalition structures

Gallo, Oihane; Iñarra García, Elena - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 3, pp. 933-950

induce hedonic games that admit core-stability. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010047

Competition and networks of collaboration

Roketskiy, Nikita - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1077-1110

I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010052

Coalition formation and history dependence

Dutta, Bhaskar; Vartiainen, Hannu - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 1, pp. 159-197

by establishing non-emptyness results for all finite games as well as transferable utility partition function games. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215314

Equilibrium coalitional behavior

Kimya, Mert - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 2, pp. 669-714

I develop two related solution concepts, equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior, which capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189002

Cooperative strategic games

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a …, at least in part because the existing definition (for games with more than two players) consists of an ad hoc scheme that …, and computational formula-to Bayesian games. We then apply the value in simple models of corruption, oligopolistic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189026

Robust group strategy-proofness

Kivinen, Steven; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1351-1389

Strategy-proofness (SP) is a sought-after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy-proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189078