Showing 1 - 10 of 55
We investigate a normative theory of incomplete preferences in the context of preliminary screening procedures. We introduce a theory of ranking in the presence of objectively incomparable marginal contributions (apples and oranges). Our theory recommends benchmarking, a method under which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010033
This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs they could produce by forming coalitions. Outputs, insufficient to meet the claims and are rationed by a rule whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010047
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599527
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934645
Economic agents care about their relative well-being, and the comparisons are usually local. We capture this using a network model, in which an agent's payoff depends on the ranking of their allocation among their network neighbors’. Given a network, an allocation is called α-stable if no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536951
This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and was recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010011
I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010052
Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance by Harsanyi (1974) and Ray and Vohra (2015), have typically been based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215314
I develop two related solution concepts, equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior, which capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189002