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Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry
Ye, Lixin; Zhang, Chenglin - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 1, pp. 141-173
We consider consumer entry in the canonical monopolistic nonlinear pricing model ( Mussa and Rosen 1978) wherein consumers learn their preference 'types' after incurring privately known entry costs. We show that by taking into account consumer entry, the nature of optimal nonlinear pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010066
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Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships
Loertscher, Simon; Wasser, Cédric - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2018) 3, pp. 1063-1114
For a partnership model with general type distributions and interdependent values, we derive the optimal dissolution mechanisms that, for arbitrary initial ownership, maximize any convex combination of revenue and social surplus. The solution involves ironing around typically interior worst-off...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215302
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A theory of personal budgeting
Galperti, Simone - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 1, pp. 173-210
Prominent research argues that consumers often use personal budgets to manage self-control problems. This paper analyzes the link between budgeting and self-control problems in consumption-saving decisions. It shows that the use of good-specific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215309
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A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
Segal, Ilya R.; Whinston, Michael D. - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 1, pp. 109-125
We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599440
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A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
Segal, Ilya R.; Whinston, Michael D. - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 1
We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008461127
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Information, evolution and utility
Swinkels, Jeroen M.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 119-142
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599367
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Slow persuasion
Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 1, pp. 129-162
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question … in a dynamic model in which a `sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a … sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536988
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Information and targeted spending
Eguia, Jon X.; Nicolò, Antonio - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 2, pp. 373-402
We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215297
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Information, evolution and utility
Swinkels, Jeroen M.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 119-142
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212485
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Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment
Watson, Joel; Buzard, Kristy - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 2, pp. 283-322
This paper examines a class of contractual relationships with specific investment, a non-durable trading opportunity, and renegotiation. Trade actions are modeled as individual and trade-action-based option contracts ("non-forcing contracts") are explored. The paper introduces the distinction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599463