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the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in … general class of asymmetric, two-player all-pay auctions where we allow for spillovers in each player's reward. The link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536891
result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738410
result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599512
but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008606492
but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599444
equitable allocation among inequity-averse agents and in a domain with linear externalities that we introduce. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188497
equitable allocation among inequity-averse agents and in a domain with linear externalities that we introduce. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599572
I prove an efficiency result for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which one player's utility is … assumptions, the efficiency result partially extends to settings in which one player has private information that determines every …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010003
In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599416
In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515733