Showing 1 - 10 of 28
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matching exists in a discrete matching market when firms' preference profile satisfies a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537033
This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …-specific information, we propose a stability notion which, in addition to requiring individual rationality and no blocking pairs, captures …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215321
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599371
Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536989
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812748
A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the other is a strong version of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599369
We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599413
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599445
dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in … stability while gaining budget balance out of equilibrium. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599472
This paper extends a family of well-known stability theorems for monotone economies to a significantly larger class of … models. We provide a set of general conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of stationary distributions when … monotonicity holds. The conditions in our main result are both necessary and sufficient for global stability of monotone economies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599516