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A general framework for rational learning in social networks
Mueller-Frank, Manuel - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 1, pp. 1-40
This paper provides a formal characterization of the process of rational learning in social networks. Agents receive … rational learning leads to global consensus, local indifference and local disagreement are characterized. In the general … setting considered, rational learning can lead to pairs of neighbors selecting different actions once learning ends, while not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599474
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Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks
Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman; Acemoglu, Daron - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 41-97
taking an (irreversible) action. We define \textit{asymptotic learning} as the fraction of agents taking the correct action … converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … ``information hubs'', which receive and distribute a large amount of information. Asymptotic learning therefore requires information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599505
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Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown
Jovanovic, Boyan; Prat, Julien - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599530
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A dynamic model of censorship
Sun, Yiman - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 29-60
We study the interaction between an agent of uncertain type, whose project gives rise to both good and bad news, and an evaluator who must decide if and when to fire the agent. The agent can hide bad news from the evaluator at some cost, and will do so if this secures her a significant increase...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537007
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Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295
We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215318
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Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown
Jovanovic, Boyan; Prat, Julien - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019211
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A general framework for rational learning in social networks
Mueller-Frank, Manuel - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 1
This paper provides a formal characterization of the process of rational learning in social networks. Agents receive … rational learning leads to global consensus, local indifference and local disagreement are characterized. In the general … setting considered, rational learning can lead to pairs of neighbors selecting different actions once learning ends, while not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395396
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Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks
Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman; Acemoglu, Daron - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1
taking an (irreversible) action. We define \textit{asymptotic learning} as the fraction of agents taking the correct action … converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … ``information hubs'', which receive and distribute a large amount of information. Asymptotic learning therefore requires information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738405
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Rewards and punishments: informal contracting through social preferences
Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 3, pp. 1145-1179
, and derive novel testable predictions about the way externalities are internalized in informal settings. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599594
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Attack and interception in networks
Bloch, Francis; Chatterjee, Kalyan; Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1511-1546
This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536957