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Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
Nava, Francesco; Piccione, Michele - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 279-312
The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599512
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Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
Nava, Francesco; Piccione, Michele - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1
The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738410
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Social activity and network formation
Baetz, Oliver - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 315-340
. There exists a unique and stable positive activity equilibrium on exogenous networks under mild conditions. When we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599542
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Social distance and network structures
Iijima, Ryota; Kamada, Yuichiro - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 655-689
determines the structures of networks. In our model, agents are endowed with their own multidimensional characteristics and their … stable networks, and analyze how they are related to the way agents measure social distances. The model predicts the small …-formation costs, the model also accommodates other well documented empirical patterns of social networks such as skewed degree …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010081
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Social activity and network formation
Baetz, Oliver - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
. There exists a unique and stable positive activity equilibrium on exogenous networks under mild conditions. When we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765119
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Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé; … - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 395-423
In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599466
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Fairness and externalities
Velez, Rodrigo A. - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 381-410
We study equitable allocation of indivisible goods and money among agents with other-regarding preferences. First, we argue that Foley's (1967) equity test, i.e., the requirement that no agent prefer the allocation obtained by swapping her consumption with another agent, is suitable for our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599572
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Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé; … - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3
In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009216676
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Fairness and externalities
Velez, Rodrigo A. - In: Theoretical Economics (2015)
We study equitable allocation of indivisible goods and money among agents with other-regarding preferences. First, we argue that Foley's (1967) equity test, i.e., the requirement that no agent prefer the allocation obtained by swapping her consumption with another agent, is suitable for our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188497
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Attack and interception in networks
Bloch, Francis; Chatterjee, Kalyan; Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1511-1546
This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536957