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Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 1, pp. 129-162

What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question … in a dynamic model in which a `sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a … sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536988

Information and targeted spending

Eguia, Jon X.; Nicolò, Antonio - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 2, pp. 373-402

We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215297

Information, evolution and utility

Swinkels, Jeroen M.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 119-142

Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599367

Information, evolution and utility

Swinkels, Jeroen M.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 119-142

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212485

Contracting over persistent information

Zhao, Wei; Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, … - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 2, pp. 917-974

the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the … action and discloses information as a reward in the next period, until either this action becomes statically optimal for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015419643

Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers

Galperti, Simone; Perego, Jacopo - In: Theoretical Economics 20 (2025) 2, pp. 667-711

We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete-information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers …. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over … additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a "revelation-principle" result for settings …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015419669

Dynamic project selection

Nikandrova, Arina; Pancs, Romans - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 115-143

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010022

Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking

Ordoñez, Guillermo L. - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 3, pp. 653-700

Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599495

Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking

Ordoñez, Guillermo L. - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 3

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019205

Data and incentives

Liang, Annie; Madsen, Erik - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 407-448

``Big data" gives markets access to previously unmeasured characteristics of individual agents. Policymakers must decide whether and how to regulate the use of this data. We study how new data affects incentives for agents to exert effort in settings such as the labor market, where an agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536868