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Information, evolution and utility
Swinkels, Jeroen M.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 119-142
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599367
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Slow persuasion
Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 1, pp. 129-162
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question … in a dynamic model in which a `sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a … sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536988
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Information and targeted spending
Eguia, Jon X.; Nicolò, Antonio - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 2, pp. 373-402
We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215297
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Information, evolution and utility
Swinkels, Jeroen M.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 119-142
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212485
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Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking
Ordoñez, Guillermo L. - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 3, pp. 653-700
Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599495
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Dynamic project selection
Nikandrova, Arina; Pancs, Romans - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 115-143
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010022
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Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking
Ordoñez, Guillermo L. - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 3
Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019205
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Data and incentives
Liang, Annie; Madsen, Erik - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 407-448
``Big data" gives markets access to previously unmeasured characteristics of individual agents. Policymakers must decide whether and how to regulate the use of this data. We study how new data affects incentives for agents to exert effort in settings such as the labor market, where an agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536868
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Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability
Ely, Jeffrey C.; Peski, Marcin - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 19-65
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descriptions of the players …' information for the purposes of determining a player's behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution … concepts. We then investigate what is essential about a player's information to identify behavior. We specialize to two player …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599364
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599373