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A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010053
known technology to produce fake successes. This latter option either makes the provision of incentives for honesty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599585
some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599538
some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145593
We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536851
We study binary action network games with strategic complementarities. An agent acts if the aggregate social influence of her friends exceeds a transfer levied on the agent by a principal. The principal seeks to maximize her revenue while inducing everyone to act in a unique equilibrium. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536860
In this paper, I study the dynamic delegation problem in a principal-agent model wherein an agent privately observes a persistently evolving state, and the principal commits to actions based on the agent's reported state. There are no transfers. While the agent has state-independent preferences,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536863
We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536864
We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536865
I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536866