This paper formulates equilibrium concepts in the large (non atomic) household model under the team notion, characterizes a class of equilibrium allocations, explores whether an equilibrium allocation in the large-household model is a limit of equilibrium allocations in the finite-household...

We construct a continuous-time, New-Monetarist economy that displays an endogenous, non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. Properties of equilibria are obtained analytically and equilibria are solved in closed form in a variety of cases. Lump-sum transfers financed with money creation...

We develop a monetary model in which a private company issues digital currency and uses payment data to estimate consumers' preferences. Sellers purchase preference information to produce goods that better match consumers' preferences. A monopoly arises in the digital currency industry, and...

This paper shows that belief-driven economic fluctuations are a general feature of many determinate macroeconomic models. In environments with hidden state variables, forecast-model misspecification can break the link between indeterminacy and sunspots by establishing the existence of...

This paper formulates equilibrium concepts in the large (non atomic) household model under the team notion, characterizes a class of equilibrium allocations, explores whether an equilibrium allocation in the large-household model is a limit of equilibrium allocations in the finite-household...

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and...

A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular,...

This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are...

We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation...

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even...