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Moulin, Hervé - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 587-619

We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010079

Information aggregation in Poisson elections

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 1, pp. 1-23

The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189048

Optimal sequential contests

Hinnosaar, Toomas - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 207-244

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536866

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482

by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599519

Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 505-525

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010034

Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 1, pp. 211-247

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting … surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about agenda manipulation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010068

Multinary group identification

Cho, Wonki Jo; Ju, Biung-Ghi - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 513-531

Group identification refers to the problem of classifying individuals into groups (e.g., racial or ethnic classification). We consider a multinary group identification model where memberships to three or more groups are simultaneously determined based on individual opinions on who belong to what...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010076

Two-stage majoritarian choice

Horan, Sean; Sprumont, Yves - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 521-537

We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first of these relations is used to pare down the set of the feasible alternatives into a shortlist while the second is used to make a final...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536960

Collective hold-up

Iaryczower, Matiás; Oliveros, Santiago - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1063-1100

We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics, including lobbying, exclusive deals, and acquisition of complementary patents. In this context, we study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537034

Agendas in legislative decision-making

Horan, Sean - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 1, pp. 235-274

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on … characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize … related to the prevailing rules for order-of-voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013188992

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