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Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536950
While many theoretical works, particularly in Family Economics, rely on the Transferable Utility (TU) assumption, its exact implications in terms of individual preferences have never been fully worked out. In this paper, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a group to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189034
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599445
notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599548
We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are … workers are gross substitutes to each firm. It turns out that by introducing job security, stability and efficiency may still …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010061
A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete information. This … possible degree of rationality that can be ascribed to their proponents. A matching is deemed ``stable'' if maintaining the … ``incomplete-information stability,'' a cooperative solution concept put forward by Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite and Samuelson (2014 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536894
This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale …-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers …) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010
We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189024
military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion …, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is …Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189041
In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept … that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two-sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to … stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully substitutable and satisfy the Laws of Aggregate Supply and Demand. In the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189046