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Kaya, Ayça; Liu, Qingmin - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 341-383

We study the role that price transparency plays in determining the efficiency and surplus division in a sequential bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions, and for any discount factor, we show that the unobservability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599543

Transparency and price formation

Kaya, Ayça; Liu, Qingmin - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765118

Stability in repeated matching markets

Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale …-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers …) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010

Learning by matching

Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 1, pp. 29-56

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215321

Pricing and investments in matching markets

Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 2, pp. 535-590

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values—the values to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599491

Pricing and investments in matching markets

Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 2

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values—the values to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019204

Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers

Sadakane, Hitoshi - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 1, pp. 267-301

We analyze a cheap-talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in a finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, the sender sends a message in each period, and the receiver then voluntarily pays money for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537029

Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning

Pomatto, Luciano - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1619-1649

A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete information. This … possible degree of rationality that can be ascribed to their proponents. A matching is deemed ``stable'' if maintaining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536894

Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention

Moreno, Diego; Wooders, John - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 2, pp. 601-639

We study non-stationary dynamic decentralized markets with adverse selection in which trade is bilateral and prices are determined by bargaining. Examples include labor markets, housing markets, and markets for financial assets. We characterize equilibrium, and identify the dynamics of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599579

A theory of political gridlock

Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 555-586

This paper studies how electoral incentives influence the outcomes of political negotiations. It considers a game between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties' popularity varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010078

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