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A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence

Olszewski, Wojciech; Chung, Kim-Sau - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 4, pp. 469-487

We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599395

Auction design in the presence of collusion

Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 3, pp. 383-429

We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way … they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599408

Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence

Virág, Gábor - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 2, pp. 241-274

The literature on competing auctions offers a model where sellers compete for buyers by setting reserve prices freely. An important outstanding conjecture (e.g. Peters and Severinov (1997)) is that the sellers post prices close to their marginal costs when the market becomes large. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599429

Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

Serizawa, Shigehiro; Morimoto, Shuhei - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 445-487

ascending (SA) auction, our result supports SA auctions adopted by many governments. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599546

Implementation with interdependent valuations

Postlewaite, Andrew; McLean, Richard - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599559

Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget

Burkett, Justin - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 133-155

I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation … that the optimal auction with budget-constrained bidders has a standard solution analogous to the one for classic models. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599565

A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points

Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Ely, Jeffrey C. - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 2, pp. 455-485

We study optimal price discrimination when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with reference-dependent preferences. A consumer's valuation for product quality consists of an intrinsic valuation affected by a private state signal (type), and a gain-loss valuation that depends on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599574

Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency

Kojima, Fuhito; Yamashita, Takuro - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1393-1438

We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and …. Our mechanism is the first double auction mechanism with these properties in the interdependent values setting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010016

Inefficient rushes in auctions

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306

, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best … main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also … show how this result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010027

Job security, stability, and production efficiency

Fu, Hu; Kleinberg, Robert D.; Lavi, Ron; Smorodinsky, Rann - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 1, pp. 1-24

We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are secured by regulation. Without job security Kelso and Crawford have shown that stable outcomes and efficiency prevail when all workers are gross substitutes to each firm. It turns...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010061

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