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A common-value auction with state-dependent participation

Lauermann, Stephan; Wolinsky, Asher - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 841-881

This paper analyzes a common-value, first-price auction with state-dependent participation. The number of bidders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536902

Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1007-1039

A single seller faces a sequence of buyers with unit demand. The buyers are forward-looking and long-lived. Each buyer has private information about his arrival time and valuation where the latter evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion. Any incentive-compatible mechanism has to induce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536925

Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs

Zhang, Mengxi - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 95-129

I investigate the design of effort-maximizing mechanisms when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget. I first demonstrate that it is always optimal for the designer to utilize a contest with as many participants as possible....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536940

Equilibrium existence in games with ties

Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 2, pp. 481-502

We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games, and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at "ties." These games include a general version of all-pay contests,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536959

Loss aversion in sequential auctions

Rosato, Antonio - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 2, pp. 561-596

I analyze sequential auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders who have independent private values and unit demand. Equilibrium bids are history dependent and subject to a discouragement effect: the higher the winning bid in the current round is, the less aggressive the bids of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536961

On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion

MacKenzie, Andrew; Trudeau, Christian - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1181-1223

We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536965

Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions

Gretschko, Vitali; Mass, Helene - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 61-93

essentially unique and efficient worst-case equilibrium of the first-price auction, which has appealing properties from both the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537021

Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency

Kojima, Fuhito; Yamashita, Takuro - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1393-1438

We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and …. Our mechanism is the first double auction mechanism with these properties in the interdependent values setting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010016

Inefficient rushes in auctions

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306

, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best … main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also … show how this result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010027

Job security, stability, and production efficiency

Fu, Hu; Kleinberg, Robert D.; Lavi, Ron; Smorodinsky, Rann - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 1, pp. 1-24

We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are secured by regulation. Without job security Kelso and Crawford have shown that stable outcomes and efficiency prevail when all workers are gross substitutes to each firm. It turns...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010061