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Robust stability in matching markets
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599445
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A theory of school choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595
-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599548
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Stability in repeated matching markets
Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757
This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale …-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers …) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010
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A theory of school choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019208
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Robust stability in matching markets
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 2
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490389
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On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
Echenique, Federico; Chambers, Christopher P. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 137-162
We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599507
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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Ünver, M. Utku; Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; … - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 253-277
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599511
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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Andersson, Tommy - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599527
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Negotiation across multiple issues
Persitz, Dotan; Gayer, Gabrielle - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969
problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599589
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Cooperative strategic games
Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189026