We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

action policies with celebrated matching mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance and top trading cycles algorithms …

requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts … properties. We expect the use of our mechanisms to improve the performance of matching markets with distributional constraints in …

the Student Exchange under Partial Fairness (SEPF). Each member of this class gives a partially stable matching that is … not Pareto dominated by another partially stable matching (i.e. constrained efficient in the class of partially stable … matchings). Moreover, any constrained efficient matching that Pareto improves upon a partially stable matching can be obtained …

action policies with celebrated matching mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance and top trading cycles algorithms …

-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …