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A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Szentes, Balazs; Koriyama, Yukio - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 2, pp. 227-252
This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599420
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Condorcet meets Ellsberg
Ellis, Andrew - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 3, pp. 865-895
studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averse -- exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599587
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Information aggregation in Poisson elections
Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 1, pp. 1-23
The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189048
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A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Szentes, Balazs; Koriyama, Yukio - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 2
This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005256847
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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 483-513
weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599520
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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2
weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773108
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Rationalizable voting
Kalandrakis, Tasos - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 1, pp. 93-125
When is a finite number of binary voting choices consistent with the hypothesis that the voter has preferences that … voting decisions. Without knowledge of the location of the voting alternatives, voting decisions by multiple voters impose no … joint testable restrictions on the location of their ideal points, even in one dimension. Furthermore, the voting records of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599425
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Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property
Vartiainen, Hannu - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 187-216
Slavov (2009) in the context of repeated voting, and of the solution of Konishi and Ray (2003) and Vartiainen (2011) in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599509
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One-dimensional mechanism design
Moulin, Hervé - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 587-619
We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010079
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Rationalizable voting
Kalandrakis, Tasos - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 1
When is a finite number of binary voting choices consistent with the hypothesis that the voter has preferences that … voting decisions. Without knowledge of the location of the voting alternatives, voting decisions by multiple voters impose no … joint testable restrictions on the location of their ideal points, even in one dimension. Furthermore, the voting records of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545873