Showing 1 - 10 of 182
the (possibly misspecified) prior belief that her local network is the entire network. We present a tractable learning … rule to implement such locally Bayesian learning: each agent extracts new information using the full history of observed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215328
The epistemic conditions of rationality and mth-order strong belief of rationality (RmSBR; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002) formalize the idea that players engage in contextualized forward-induction reasoning. This paper characterizes the behavior consistent with RmSBR across all type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013188995
Is it possible to guarantee that the mere exposure of a subject to a belief elicitation task will not affect the very same beliefs that we are trying to elicit? In this paper, we introduce mechanisms that make it simultaneously strictly dominant for the subject (a) not to acquire any information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189019
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599472
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246638
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically …, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599374
This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599433
The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly, and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature’s choice. Over time, they can learn the state...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599461
taking an (irreversible) action. We define \textit{asymptotic learning} as the fraction of agents taking the correct action … converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … ``information hubs'', which receive and distribute a large amount of information. Asymptotic learning therefore requires information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599505
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599530