One of the most well-known models of non-expected utility is Gul (1991)'s model of Disappointment Aversion. This model, however, is defined implicitly, as the solution to a functional equation; its explicit utility representation is unknown, which may limit its applicability. We show that an...

One of the most well known models of non‐expected utility is Gul's (1991) model of disappointment aversion. This model, however, is defined implicitly, as the solution to a functional equation; its explicit utility representation is unknown, which may limit its applicability. We show that an...

As in Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler \cite{GMMS}, we consider a decision maker characterized by two binary relations: $\succsim^{\ast}$ and $\succsim^{{\small \wedge}}$. The first binary relation is a Bewley preference. It\ models the rankings for which the decision maker is sure....

As in Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler \cite{GMMS}, we consider a decision maker characterized by two binary relations: $\succsim^{\ast}$ and $\succsim^{{\small \wedge}}$. The first binary relation is a Bewley preference. It\ models the rankings for which the decision maker is sure....

Two of the most well known regularities observed in preferences under risk and uncertainty are ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. We study the behavior of an agent who can display both tendencies simultaneously. We introduce a novel notion of preference for hedging that applies to both...

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...

We propose a class of dynamic models that capture subjective (and hence unobservable) constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can acquire, pay attention to, or absorb, via an Information Choice Process (ICP). An ICP specifies the information that can be acquired about the...

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...