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Auction design in the presence of collusion
Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 3, pp. 383-429
colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599408
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Auction design in the presence of collusion
Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 3
colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515735
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Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
Chandrasekher, Madhav - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1, pp. 11-49
collusion-proof contracts with two properties. First, equilibrium payoffs to both the principal and the agents approach their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599533
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Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions
Zhang, Wenzhang - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1847-1895
In the context of repeated first-price auctions, we explore how a bid-rigging cartel can simultaneously overcome the difficulty of soliciting truthful private information about valuations and the difficulty of enforcing its internal mechanism. Focusing on the class of trigger-strategy collusive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536968
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Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
Chandrasekher, Madhav - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1
collusion-proof contracts with two properties. First, equilibrium payoffs to both the principal and the agents approach their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145595
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Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1, pp. 67-101
when players can use communication to replicate any outcome that would have been sustainable were this information public …. A benchmark result is that if only cheap talk communication is possible then public information can only be replicated … without explicit communication or with cheap talk communication only. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599535
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Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
Zhang, Wenzhang; Chan, Jimmy H. - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 53-87
-payments, approximate efficiency is achievable in any repeated game with private monitoring and communication, so long as the players can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599563
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Communication and cooperation in repeated games
Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 2, pp. 513-553
We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication … payoffs outside the set ε-CCE. Thus, in our model, communication is necessary for cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215317
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Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1
when players can use communication to replicate any outcome that would have been sustainable were this information public …. A benchmark result is that if only cheap talk communication is possible then public information can only be replicated … without explicit communication or with cheap talk communication only. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145596
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Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
Zhang, Wenzhang; Chan, Jimmy H. - In: Theoretical Economics (2014)
-payments, approximate efficiency is achievable in any repeated game with private monitoring and communication, so long as the players can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011093701