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There are two varieties of timing games in economics: wars of attrition, in which having more predecessors helps, and pre-emption games, in which having more predecessors hurts. This paper introduces and explores a spanning class with rank-order payoffs that subsumes both varieties as special...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599402
There are two varieties of timing games in economics: wars of attrition, in which having more predecessors helps, and pre-emption games, in which having more predecessors hurts. This paper introduces and explores a spanning class with rank-order payoffs that subsumes both varieties as special...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515728
We characterise optimal contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model of joint production in which project opportunities are heterogenous, utility from these projects is non-transferable and the agent has the option to quit the relationship at any time. In order to demand the production of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013188999
We consider dynamic team production in the presence of uncertainty. Team members receive interim feedback that depends on both their current effort level and the project's uncertain prospects. In this environment, each member can encourage the others by making them more optimistic about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189023
Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Profit is stochastically higher when the agent is qualified for the task, but the principal cannot observe qualification. Her only decision is which of the two agents to assign, if any, given the public history of selections...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189062
Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599465
When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536891
This paper studies an N-person war of attrition which needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition may change over time. We introduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215322
Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009216675
of complementary patents. In this context, we study how the allocation of bargaining power between principal and agents … agents increases inefficient delay and reduces agents' welfare. This occurs in spite of the lack of informational asymmetries …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537034