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Kivinen, Steven; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1351-1389

Strategy-proofness (SP) is a sought-after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy-proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189078

Intertemporal substitution and recursive smooth ambiguity preferences

Miao, Jianjun; Hayashi, Takashi - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 3, pp. 423-472

In this paper, we establish an axiomatically founded generalized recursive smooth ambiguity model that allows for a … separation among intertemporal substitution, risk aversion, and ambiguity aversion. We axiomatize this model using two approaches … Seo (2009). We characterize risk attitude and ambiguity attitude within these two approaches. We then discuss our model …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599451

Intertemporal substitution and recursive smooth ambiguity preferences

Miao, Jianjun; Hayashi, Takashi - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 3

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694967

Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?

Zame, William R. - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 2, pp. 187-202

A long Utilitarian tradition has the ideal of equal regard for all individuals, both those now living and those yet to be born. The literature formalizes this ideal as asking for a preference relation on the space of infinite utility streams that is complete, transitive, invariant to finite...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599387

Rationalizable voting

Kalandrakis, Tasos - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 1, pp. 93-125

When is a finite number of binary voting choices consistent with the hypothesis that the voter has preferences that admit a (quasi)concave utility representation? I derive necessary and sufficient conditions and a tractable algorithm to verify their validity. I show that the hypothesis that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599425

The ex-ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty

Nascimento, Leandro - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 535-570

perception of ambiguity or the attitude towards it. A convexity axiom for the ex-ante preference characterizes a (collective …, which also allow us to interpret Segal's (1987) two-stage approach to ambiguity as the ex-ante aggregation of (Bayesian …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599470

Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 1, pp. 95-123

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599477

Two-stage threshold representations

Manzini, Paola; Tyson, Christopher J.; Mariotti, Marco - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 3, pp. 875-882

We study two-stage choice procedures in which the decision maker first preselects the alternatives whose values according to a criterion pass a menu-dependent threshold, and then maximizes a second criterion to narrow the selection further. This framework overlaps with several existing models...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599502

The limit of discounted utilitarianism

Jonsson, Adam; Voorneveld, Mark - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 19-37

This paper presents an infinite-horizon version of intergenerational utilitarianism. By studying discounted utilitarianism as the discount factor tends to one, we obtain a new welfare criterion: limit-discounted utilitarianism (LDU). We show that LDU meets the standard assumptions of efficiency,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010018

Collusion constrained equilibrium

Dutta, Rohan; Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 307-340

We study collusion within groups in noncooperative games. The primitives are the preferences of the players, their assignment to nonoverlapping groups, and the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group coordinates the play of its members among different incentive compatible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010028