Showing 1 - 10 of 248
In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599466
In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009216676
Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010043
A set of indivisible objects is allocated among agents with strict preferences. Each object has a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is solvable if there is a strategy-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010050
Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189041
We consider general asset market environments in which agents with quasilinear payoffs are endowed with objects and have demands for other agents' objects. We show that if all agents have a maximum demand of one object and are endowed with at most one object, the VCG transfer of each agent is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536857
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599444
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008606492
Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010086
We generalize the school choice problem by defining a notion of allowable priority violations. In this setting, a weak axiom of stability (partial stability) allows only certain priority violations. We introduce a class of algorithms called the Student Exchange under Partial Fairness (SEPF)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215296