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Transparency and price formation
Kaya, Ayça; Liu, Qingmin - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 341-383
bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions, and for any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599543
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A theory of political gridlock
Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 555-586
between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties' popularity … substantial effects on bargaining outcomes. Periods of gridlock may arise when the election is close and parties have similar …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010078
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Bargaining with evolving private information
Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 885-916
I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The …-best is implementable via a mechanism, whereas all equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining game are inefficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536929
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Transparency and price formation
Kaya, Ayça; Liu, Qingmin - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions, and for any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765118
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The dynamics of instability
Barilla, César; Gonçalves, Duarte - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 365-405
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536977
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Stability in repeated matching markets
Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757
This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010
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Collective hold-up
Iaryczower, Matiás; Oliveros, Santiago - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1063-1100
of complementary patents. In this context, we study how the allocation of bargaining power between principal and agents … completion, efficiency requires concentrating bargaining power in the principal. Strengthening the bargaining position of the … or discriminatory offers. When this collective action problem is severe enough, agents are better off when bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537034
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Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention
Moreno, Diego; Wooders, John - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 2, pp. 601-639
determined by bargaining. Examples include labor markets, housing markets, and markets for financial assets. We characterize …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599579
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Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs
Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 817-861
I study the problem of a durable goods monopolist who lacks commitment power and whose marginal cost of production varies stochastically over time. I show that a monopolist with stochastic costs usually serves the different types of consumers at different times and charges them different prices....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010085
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Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512
I study a repeated principal-agent game with long-term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189009