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Information aggregation in competitive markets
Siga, Lucas; Mihm, Maximilian - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 1, pp. 161-196
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information---the betweenness property---that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189021
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Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 95-118
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an … application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher … expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599366
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Optimal auctions with ambiguity
Bose, Subir; Ozdenoren, Emre; Pape, Andreas - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 4, pp. 411-438
A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Agents may be ambiguity averse (modeled using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599377
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Auction design in the presence of collusion
Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 3, pp. 383-429
We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for extracting payments from the agents in such a situation are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599408
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
Postlewaite, Andrew; McLean, Richard - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599559
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Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
Burkett, Justin - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 133-155
I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation mechanism). I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the principal's beliefs about the value of the item for a simple budget constraint to be the optimal contract. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599565
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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306
We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010027
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Auction design without quasilinear preferences
Baisa, Brian - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 1, pp. 53-78
standard auctions that allocate the good to the highest bidder. Instead, the auctioneer better exploits bidder preferences by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010063
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Competing with asking prices
Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 731-770
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010083
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Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers
Betto, Maria; Thomas, Matthew W. - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 169-206
general class of asymmetric, two-player all-pay auctions where we allow for spillovers in each player's reward. The link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536891