We study the interaction of incentives to free-ride on information acquisition and strategically delay irreversible investment in environments in which multiple firms evaluate an investment opportunity. In our model, two firms decide how quickly to privately obtain information about the...

We build a model studying the effect of an economy's potential for social learning on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. Assuming consumers are forward-looking (i.e., recognize the value of waiting for information), we analyze how qualitative and quantitative features of the...

Banks hold liquid and illiquid assets. An illiquid bank that receives a liquidity shock sells assets to liquid banks in exchange for cash. We characterize the constrained efficient allocation as the solution to a planner's problem and show that the market equilibrium is constrained inefficient,...

Banks hold liquid and illiquid assets. An illiquid bank that receives a liquidity shock sells assets to liquid banks in exchange for cash. We characterize the constrained efficient allocation as the solution to a planner's problem and show that the market equilibrium is constrained inefficient,...

We investigate how information goods are priced and diffused over links in a network. A new equivalence relation between nodes captures the effects of network architecture and locations of sellers on the division of profits, and characterizes the topology of competing (and potentially...

We show that Bayesian posteriors concentrate on the outcome distributions that approximately minimize the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the empirical distribution, uniformly over sample paths, even when the prior does not have full support. This generalizes Diaconis and Freedman (1990)'s...

In this paper, I study the dynamic delegation problem in a principal-agent model wherein an agent privately observes a persistently evolving state, and the principal commits to actions based on the agent's reported state. There are no transfers. While the agent has state-independent preferences,...

We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the...

We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave...

``Big data" gives markets access to previously unmeasured characteristics of individual agents. Policymakers must decide whether and how to regulate the use of this data. We study how new data affects incentives for agents to exert effort in settings such as the labor market, where an agent's...