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Information aggregation in competitive markets
Siga, Lucas; Mihm, Maximilian - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 1, pp. 161-196
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189021
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Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434
potential bidder who is omitted from the auction. If the object is optimally sold with probability less than one, then optimal … mechanisms skew the allocation towards bidders with lower signals. This can be implemented via a modified Vickrey auction, where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189042
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Robust scoring rules
Tsakas, Elias - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 3, pp. 955-987
Is it possible to guarantee that the mere exposure of a subject to a belief elicitation task will not affect the very same beliefs that we are trying to elicit? In this paper, we introduce mechanisms that make it simultaneously strictly dominant for the subject (a) not to acquire any information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189019
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Optimal auctions with ambiguity
Bose, Subir; Ozdenoren, Emre; Pape, Andreas - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 4, pp. 411-438
A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a … unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of … the bidders face more ambiguity than the seller we show that (i) given any auction, the seller can always (weakly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599377
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First-price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy-it-now-prices with Allais paradox bidders
Nakajima, Daisuke - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 3, pp. 473-498
with such preferences. We show that the Dutch auction systematically yields a higher revenue than the first-price auction … in the expected utility case. We also show that introducing a "buy-it-now-price" to the first-price auction increases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599452
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A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points
Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Ely, Jeffrey C. - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 2, pp. 455-485
We study optimal price discrimination when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with reference-dependent preferences. A consumer's valuation for product quality consists of an intrinsic valuation affected by a private state signal (type), and a gain-loss valuation that depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599574
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Loss aversion in sequential auctions
Rosato, Antonio - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 2, pp. 561-596
I analyze sequential auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders who have independent private values and unit demand. Equilibrium bids are history dependent and subject to a discouragement effect: the higher the winning bid in the current round is, the less aggressive the bids of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536961
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Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions
Gretschko, Vitali; Mass, Helene - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 61-93
essentially unique and efficient worst-case equilibrium of the first-price auction, which has appealing properties from both the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537021
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First-price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy-it-now-prices with Allais paradox bidders
Nakajima, Daisuke - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 3
with such preferences. We show that the Dutch auction systematically yields a higher revenue than the first-price auction … in the expected utility case. We also show that introducing a "buy-it-now-price" to the first-price auction increases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008741322
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Optimal auctions with ambiguity
Bose, Subir; Ozdenoren, Emre; Pape, Andreas - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 4, pp. 411-438
A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a … unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of … the bidders face more ambiguity than the seller we show that (i) given any auction, the seller can always (weakly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812755