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Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations
Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 3, pp. 853-865
We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599555
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On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules
Allman, Maxwell; Ashlagi, Itai; Nikzad, Afshin - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 2, pp. 707-748
Lotteries are a common way to resolve ties in assignment mechanisms that ration resources. We consider a model with a continuum of agents and a finite set of re- sources with heterogeneous qualities, where the agents’ preferences are generated from a multinomial-logit (MNL) model based on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536972
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Stability in repeated matching markets
Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757
This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale …-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers …) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010
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School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance
Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 3, pp. 1095-1133
We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189024
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Pricing and investments in matching markets
Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 2, pp. 535-590
make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values—the values to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599491
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Pricing and investments in matching markets
Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 2
make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values—the values to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019204
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Matching with slot-specific priorities: theory
Kominers, Scott Duke; Sönmez, Tayfun - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 2, pp. 683-710
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599581
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The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
Schlegel, Jan Christoph - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 801-839
two-sided matching markets with transfers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536850
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Dynamically stable matching
Doval, Laura - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 687-724
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching … opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two … allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536854
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Interview hoarding
Manjunath, Vikram; Morrill, Thayer - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 2, pp. 503-527
Many centralized matching markets are preceded by interviews between participants, including the residency matches … between doctors and hospitals. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews in the National Resident Matching Program were …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536970