Individuals often lose confidence in their prospects as they approach the `moment of truth.' An axiomatic model of such individuals is provided. The model adapts and extends (by relaxing the Independence axiom) Gul and Pesendorfer's model of temptation and self-control to capture an individual...

This paper extends Savage's subjective approach to probability and utility from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic environments. Interactive uncertainty is modeled both explicitly, using hierarchies of preference relations, the analogue of beliefs hierarchies,...

In this paper, we establish an axiomatically founded generalized recursive smooth ambiguity model that allows for a separation among intertemporal substitution, risk aversion, and ambiguity aversion. We axiomatize this model using two approaches: the second-order act approach à la Klibanoff,...

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...

Motivated by the literature on ``choice overload'', we study a boundedly rational agent whose choice behavior admits a \textit{monotone threshold representation}: There is an underlying rational benchmark, corresponding to maximization of a utility function $v$, from which the agent's choices...

We propose a class of dynamic models that capture subjective (and hence unobservable) constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can acquire, pay attention to, or absorb, via an Information Choice Process (ICP). An ICP specifies the information that can be acquired about the...

Considerable evidence shows that people have optimistic beliefs about future outcomes. I present an axiomatic model of wishful thinking (WT), in which an endowed alternative, or status quo, influences the agent's beliefs over states and thus induces such optimism. I introduce a behavioral axiom...

One of the most well-known models of non-expected utility is Gul (1991)'s model of Disappointment Aversion. This model, however, is defined implicitly, as the solution to a functional equation; its explicit utility representation is unknown, which may limit its applicability. We show that an...

In this paper, we establish an axiomatically founded generalized recursive smooth ambiguity model that allows for a separation among intertemporal substitution, risk aversion, and ambiguity aversion. We axiomatize this model using two approaches: the second-order act approach à la Klibanoff,...

Individuals often lose confidence in their prospects as they approach the `moment of truth.' An axiomatic model of such individuals is provided. The model adapts and extends (by relaxing the Independence axiom) Gul and Pesendorfer's model of temptation and self-control to capture an individual...