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Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale …-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers …) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010

On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules

Allman, Maxwell; Ashlagi, Itai; Nikzad, Afshin - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 2, pp. 707-748

Lotteries are a common way to resolve ties in assignment mechanisms that ration resources. We consider a model with a continuum of agents and a finite set of re- sources with heterogeneous qualities, where the agents’ preferences are generated from a multinomial-logit (MNL) model based on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536972

School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance

Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 3, pp. 1095-1133

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189024

Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations

Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 3, pp. 853-865

We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599555

Robust stability in matching markets

Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599445

A theory of school choice lotteries

Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599548

A theory of school choice lotteries

Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019208

Robust stability in matching markets

Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 2

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490389

The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions

Schlegel, Jan Christoph - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 801-839

two-sided matching markets with transfers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536850

Dynamically stable matching

Doval, Laura - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 687-724

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching … opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two … allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536854