Showing 1 - 10 of 11
) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319
example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686974
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We … characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive … implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private values or a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689312
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856702
weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674460
We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding … it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702289
We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587367
Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421
I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of … can arise in equilibrium. Elaborations are proposed to shed light on why non-trivial communication protocols are used in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587426
A sender designs an information structure to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender is ignorant about the receiver's prior, and evaluates each information structure using the receiver's prior that is the worst for the sender. I characterize the optimal information structures in this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327114