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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification

Li, Yunan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1139-1194

A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget‐constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare‐maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two‐stage scheme. First, agents report...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806402

Auction design with data-driven misspecifications : inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation

Jehiel, Philippe; Mierendorff, Konrad - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 4, pp. 1543-1579

We study the existence of efficient auctions in private value settings in which some bidders form their expectations about the distribution of their competitor's bids based on the accessible data from past similar auctions consisting of bids and ex post values. We consider steady states in such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135356

Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256

but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996

Many-to-many matching and price discrimination

Gomes, Renato; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 1005-1052

We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private information about (vertical) characteristics that determine match values. Our analysis reveals how matching patterns reflect cross-subsidization between sides. Agents are endogenously partitioned into consumers and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671852

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773

A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276

Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary

Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1655-1714

We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806593

Specialization and partisanship in committee search

Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 3, pp. 751-774

A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative, or to continue costly search. Each alternative is described by a vector of distinct attributes, and each committee member can privately assess the quality of one attribute (her "specialty"). Preferences are heterogeneous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011685224

Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information

Martimort, David; Moreira, Humberto - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 5 (2010) 2, pp. 159-213

stands in sharp contrast with the more positive efficiency result that the common agency literature has unveiled when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011698562

Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions

Dilmé, Francesc - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 20 (2025) 1, pp. 209-254

effect on welfare and efficiency of making prices observable depends on the signal precision: When the signal is imprecise …, making prices public strengthens the discounting mechanism, improving efficiency and buyer welfare; when the signal is … precise, making prices public activates the rejection mechanism, and efficiency and buyer welfare may decrease. Independently …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015332593

Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup

Zhao, Rui R. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 1, pp. 85-121

between allocative efficiency and incentive provision results in rigidity in trade, the degree of which depends on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700620