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Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287

A theory of school choice lotteries

Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673364

Robust group strategy‐proofness

Kivinen, Steven; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1351-1389

Strategy‐proofness (SP) is a sought‐after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy‐proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806548

Robust stability in matching markets

Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986

Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

Hashimoto, Tadashi; Hirata, Daisuke; Kesten, Onur; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 253-277

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684921

Learning by matching

Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 29-56

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014

Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations

Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 853-865

We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673201

Matching with slot-specific priorities : theory

Kominers, Scott Duke; Sönmez, Tayfun - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 683-710

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671965

Full substitutability

Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Nichifor, … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1535-1590

properties in diverse settings such as matching, auctions, and exchange economies with indivisible goods. We extend earlier …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158861

Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities

Ehlers, Lars H.; Westkamp, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1009-1042

-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937252