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Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986

A theory of school choice lotteries

Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673364

Learning by matching

Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 29-56

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014

Lotteries in student assignment : an equivalence result

Pathak, Parag A.; Sethuraman, Jay - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 1, pp. 1-17

This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695102

Improving matching under hard distributional constraints

Fragiadakis, Daniel; Troyan, Peter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 863-908

requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts … properties. We expect the use of our mechanisms to improve the performance of matching markets with distributional constraints in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705212

Family ties : school assignment with siblings

Dur, Umut Mert; Morrill, Thayer; Phan, William - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 1, pp. 89-120

We introduce a generalization of the school choice problem motivated by the following observations: students are assigned to grades within schools, many students have siblings who are applying as well, and school districts commonly guarantee that siblings will attend the same school. This last...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806613

School choice with asymmetric information : priority design and the curse of acceptance

Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 3, pp. 1095-1133

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012309572

Alternating‐offer bargaining with the global games information structure

Tsoy, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 869-931

In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856724

Common enrollment in school choice

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Yenmez, M. Bumin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1237-1270

Increasingly, more school districts across the US are using centralized admissions for charter, magnet, and neighborhood schools in a common enrollment system. We first show that, across all school-participation patterns, full participation in the common (or unified) enrollment system leads to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158787

School choice under partial fairness

Dur, Umut Mert; Gitmez, A. Arda; Yılmaz, Özgür - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1309-1346

the Student Exchange under Partial Fairness (SEPF). Each member of this class gives a partially stable matching that is … not Pareto dominated by another partially stable matching (i.e. constrained efficient in the class of partially stable … matchings). Moreover, any constrained efficient matching that Pareto improves upon a partially stable matching can be obtained …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158795