Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 182
Cover Image
A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets
Echenique, Federico; Oviedo, Jorge - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 2, pp. 233-273
-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703024
Cover Image
von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 3, pp. 499-521
sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus … cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … set and its element is in the strong core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691082
Cover Image
Cooperative strategic games
Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287
Cover Image
Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; MacLean, Richard P. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 555-582
We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674216
Cover Image
Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games
Matthews, Steven A. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 365-403
general conditions. They imply that any efficient profile that is approximately achievable must be in the core of the …) an efficient profile can be approximately achieved if and only if it is in the core; and (iii) any achievable profile can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686703
Cover Image
Transferable utility and demand functions
Chiappori, Pierre-André; Gugl, Elisabeth - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1307-1333
While many theoretical works, particularly in Family Economics, rely on the Transferable Utility (TU) assumption, its exact implications in terms of individual preferences have never been fully worked out. In this paper, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a group to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415404
Cover Image
Negotiation across multiple issues
Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969
problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885
Cover Image
Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186
Cover Image
Decentralized bargaining in matching markets : efficient stationary equilibria and the core
Elliott, Matthew L.; Nava, Francesco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 211-251
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to determine who will be matched with whom and at what terms of trade. Once a worker-firm pair reach agreement, they exit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020318
Cover Image
Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
Pei, Harry - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 449-475
I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587361