When confronted with uncertain prospects, people often exhibit both choice deferral and Ellsberg-type ambiguity aversion. This paper obtains a joint representation for these behavioral phenomena. The decision maker as portrayed by my model is willing to choose an uncertain prospect f over g...

We introduce a model of random ambiguity aversion. Choice is stochastic due to unobserved shocks to both information and ambiguity aversion. This is modeled as a random set of beliefs in the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). We characterize the model and show that...

This paper analyzes dynamic choice for ambiguity-sensitive decision makers. It demonstrates that unambiguous behavioral predictions can be obtained, even in the face of dynamic inconsistency, by taking the individual's preferences over decision trees, rather than acts, as primitive. In...

Among the reasons behind the choice behavior of an individual taking a stochastic form are her potential indifference or indecisiveness between certain alternatives, and/or her willingness to experiment in the sense of occasionally deviating from choosing a best alternative in order to give a...

In this paper, we establish an axiomatically founded generalized recursive smooth ambiguity model that allows for a separation among intertemporal substitution, risk aversion, and ambiguity aversion. We axiomatize this model using two approaches: the second-order act approach à la Klibanoff,...

We study various decision problems regarding short-term investments in risky assets whose returns evolve continuously in time. We show that in each problem, all risk-averse decision makers have the same (problem-dependent) ranking over short-term risky assets. Moreover, in each problem, the...

As in Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler \cite{GMMS}, we consider a decision maker characterized by two binary relations: $\succsim^{\ast}$ and $\succsim^{{\small \wedge}}$. The first binary relation is a Bewley preference. It\ models the rankings for which the decision maker is sure....

One of the most well-known models of non-expected utility is Gul (1991)'s model of Disappointment Aversion. This model, however, is defined implicitly, as the solution to a functional equation; its explicit utility representation is unknown, which may limit its applicability. We show that an...

Two of the most well known regularities observed in preferences under risk and uncertainty are ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. We study the behav- ior of an agent who can display both tendencies simultaneously. We introduce a novel notion of preference for hedging that applies to both...

Following Kreps (1979), I consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her future taste. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a preference for flexibility: When choosing among menus containing alternatives for future choice, she weakly prefers menus with additional alternatives....