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Delegating performance evaluation
Letina, Igor; Liu, Shuo; Netzer, Nick - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 477-509
principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer's potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308439
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Career concerns with exponential learning
Bonatti, Alessandro; Hörner, Johannes - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 1, pp. 425-475
This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. Effort levels at different times...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704848
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The importance of being honest
Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 773-811
This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a … known technology to produce fake successes. This latter option either makes the provision of incentives for honesty … ability to generate further successes. This, in turn, provides incentives for the agent to be honest before a first success. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671897
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Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
Ashlagi, Itai; Roth, Alvin E. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 817-863
lost transplants. We identify a mechanism that gives hospitals incentives to reveal all patient-donor pairs. We observe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674090
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Mechanism design and communication networks
Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 489-533
couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player's private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689312
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Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
Szydlowski, Martin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 813-847
I study the optimal choice of projects in a continuous-time moral hazard model with multitasking. I characterize the distortions caused by moral hazard and the dynamics of the firm's project choice. Both overinvestment and underinvestment relative to an NPV criterion can occur on the path of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104572
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Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
Pei, Harry - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 449-475
I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587361
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Costly miscalibration
Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 477-506
We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587367
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Delegating learning
Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 571-603
Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421
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Communication with forgetful liars
Jehiel, Philippe - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 605-638
I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587426