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Letina, Igor; Liu, Shuo; Netzer, Nick - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 477-509

principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer's potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308439

Career concerns with exponential learning

Bonatti, Alessandro; Hörner, Johannes - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 1, pp. 425-475

This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. Effort levels at different times...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704848

Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking

Szydlowski, Martin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 813-847

I study the optimal choice of projects in a continuous-time moral hazard model with multitasking. I characterize the distortions caused by moral hazard and the dynamics of the firm's project choice. Both overinvestment and underinvestment relative to an NPV criterion can occur on the path of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104572

The importance of being honest

Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 773-811

This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a … known technology to produce fake successes. This latter option either makes the provision of incentives for honesty … ability to generate further successes. This, in turn, provides incentives for the agent to be honest before a first success. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671897

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132

Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange

Ashlagi, Itai; Roth, Alvin E. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 817-863

lost transplants. We identify a mechanism that gives hospitals incentives to reveal all patient-donor pairs. We observe …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674090

Efficient incentives with social preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 3, pp. 975-999

We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635255

Mechanism design and communication networks

Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 489-533

couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player's private …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689312

Monopolistic group design with peer effects

Board, Simon - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 89-125

In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699153

Robust virtual implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 45-88

In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699160