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Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
Auster, Sarah - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 175-204
these contracts. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855861
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Optimal dynamic contracting : the first‐order approach and beyond
Battaglini, Marco; Lamba, Rohit - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1435-1482
maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO-approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a … a class of incentive compatible contracts that can be easily characterized is approximately optimal. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158852
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Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown
Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914
incentives via short-term contracts become harder to provide as the agent's quality is revealed over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079
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Contingent preference for flexibility : eliciting beliefs from behavior
Sadowski, Philipp - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 503-534
others' ranking of contracts, also share beliefs about each others' future tastes in the face of unforeseen contingencies. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686674
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Contracts and uncertainty
Olszewski, Wojciech; Sandroni, Alvaro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 1, pp. 1-13
mitigated by screening contracts that separate informed from uninformed experts. This result stands in contrast with the … analysis of contracts under risk, where separation is often feasible. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702645
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Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512
I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are … contracts are designed to punish deviations in noncontractible behavior. If the equilibrium actions are observed, these … contracts are renegotiated away. This form of anticipated renegotiation results in welfare improvements over outcomes attainable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553
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Consumer optimism and price discrimination
Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 4, pp. 459-497
We study monopolistic design of a menu of non-linear tariffs when consumers have biased prior beliefs regarding their future preferences. In our model, consumers are "optimistic'' if their prior belief assigns too much weight to states of nature characterized by large gains from trade. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700064
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(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
Deb, Rahul; Mitchell, Matthew F.; Pai, Mallesh M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 763-800
Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273779
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Monitoring experts
Azrieli, Yaron - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1313-1350
We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision … contracts by comparing the value of information and its cost. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806483
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Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
Schumacher, Heiner; Thysen, Heidi Christina - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 1, pp. 371-414
We study a principal‐agent framework in which the agent forms beliefs about the principal's project based on a misspecified subjective model. She fits this model to the objective probability distribution to predict output under alternative actions. Misspecifications in the subjective model may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806946