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Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale–Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440097

Coalition formation under power relations

Piccione, Michele; Razin, Ronny - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 1-15

We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699228

Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria

Govindan, Srihari; Wilson, Robert - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 2, pp. 167-206

A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the other is a strong version of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703035

Matching with slot-specific priorities : theory

Kominers, Scott Duke; Sönmez, Tayfun - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 683-710

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671965

A theory of school choice lotteries

Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595

notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673364

Stochastic stability in monotone economies

Kamihigashi, Takashi; Stachurski, John - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 383-407

This paper extends a family of well-known stability theorems for monotone economies to a significantly larger class of … models. We provide a set of general conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of stationary distributions when … monotonicity holds. The conditions in our main result are both necessary and sufficient for global stability of monotone economies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674585

Stability and strategy‐proofness for matching with constraints : a necessary and sufficient condition

Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 761-793

Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856716

School choice under partial fairness

Dur, Umut Mert; Gitmez, A. Arda; Yılmaz, Özgür - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1309-1346

axiom of stability (partial stability) allows only certain priority violations. We introduce a class of algorithms called …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158795

Learning by matching

Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 29-56

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …-specific information, we propose a stability notion which, in addition to requiring individual rationality and no blocking pairs, captures …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014

Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities

Ehlers, Lars H.; Westkamp, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1009-1042

A set of indivisible objects is allocated among agents with strict preferences. Each object has a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is solvable if there is a strategy-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937252