Showing 1 - 10 of 20
military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion …, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is … feasible and an improvement for its members. Our stability notion imposes the additional condition that a coalition cannot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806304
In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept … that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two-sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to … stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully substitutable and satisfy the Laws of Aggregate Supply and Demand. In the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415626
We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012309572
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986
We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699228
A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the other is a strong version of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703035
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671965
notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673364
This paper extends a family of well-known stability theorems for monotone economies to a significantly larger class of … models. We provide a set of general conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of stationary distributions when … monotonicity holds. The conditions in our main result are both necessary and sufficient for global stability of monotone economies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674585
dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in … stability while gaining budget balance out of equilibrium. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689095