Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 127
Cover Image
Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
Gallo, Oihane; Iñarra García, Elena - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 933-950
This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs … coalition formation emerges. Using resource monotonicity and consistency, we characterize the continuous rationing rules that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937226
Cover Image
Negotiation across multiple issues
Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969
problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … decomposition of the proposed allocation for which each coalition to which she belongs derives greater benefit on each issue by … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885
Cover Image
Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy
Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256
. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996
Cover Image
Equilibrium coalitional behavior
Kimya, Mert - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 669-714
, which capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally … that specifies the negotiation procedure underlying coalition formation. Therefore, it forms a bridge between the non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308618
Cover Image
Cooperative strategic games
Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287
Cover Image
Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; MacLean, Richard P. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 555-582
We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674216
Cover Image
Optimal deadlines for agreements
Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393
Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720
Cover Image
Coalition formation and history dependence
Dutta, Bhaskar; Vartiainen, Hannu - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 159-197
dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional `moves' in which each coalition that is involved in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159046
Cover Image
Coalition formation under power relations
Piccione, Michele; Razin, Ronny - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 1-15
We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699228
Cover Image
Decentralized bargaining in matching markets : efficient stationary equilibria and the core
Elliott, Matthew L.; Nava, Francesco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 211-251
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to determine who will be matched with whom and at what terms of trade. Once a worker-firm pair reach agreement, they exit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020318