The Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) has frequently been used in recent spectrum auctions. It combines a dynamic clock … phase and a one-off supplementary round. The winning allocation and the corresponding prices are determined by the VCG rules … information revelation, that is, if the uncertainty about the final allocation is large, all equilibria of the CCA are inefficient …

Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget constraints. Focusing on …). The presence of budget constraints may lead to multiple symmetric equilibria in the first-price auction. …

with such preferences. We show that the Dutch auction systematically yields a higher revenue than the first-price auction … in the expected utility case. We also show that introducing a "buy-it-now-price" to the first-price auction increases …

compared to an optimal common reserve price. Implications for auction design are considered. …

We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation …, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best … main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also …

We analyze a divisible good uniform‐price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical …

We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our …

competitor's subsequent auction. The mechanism features transfers from buyers with the two highest valuations, allocation to the … who sells another identical unit in a second-price auction. Buyers who do not get the seller's good compete in the … buyer with the second-highest valuation, and an allocation rule that depends on the two highest valuations. It can be …

establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule … in a wide variety of problems (single object auction, multiple object auction, public good provision etc.) under suitable …