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Efficient networks in games with local complementarities

Belhaj, Mohamed; Bervoets, Sebatian; Deroïan, Frédéric - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 357-380

We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local … complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of … Nested-Split Graphs. Next, we refine our results and find that, depending on the specification of the network cost function …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672127

On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty

Penta, Antonio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 405-430

Weinstein and Yildiz (Econometrica, 2007) have shown that only very weak predictions are robust to mispecifications of higher order beliefs. Whenever a type has multiple rationalizable actions, any of these actions is uniquely rationalizable for some arbitrarily close type. Hence, refinements of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686699

Topologies on types

Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 275-309

We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703019

Learning by matching

Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 29-56

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and each firm cares about the type of her employee under a match. Moreover, firms' information structure is described by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030

Uniform topologies on types

Chen, Yi-chun; Di Tillio, Alfredo; Xiong, Siyang; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 5 (2010) 3, pp. 445-478

We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695239

Alternating‐offer bargaining with the global games information structure

Tsoy, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 869-931

In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856724

Common learning and cooperation in repeated games

Sugaya, Takuo; Yamamoto, Yuichi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 3, pp. 1175-1219

We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012309585

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 487-522

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672033

Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting

Peski, Marcin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 651-694

We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players' payoffs depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Hörner...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674194

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