In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.

This paper studies an N-person war of attrition which needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition may change over time. We introduce the...

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains...

In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...

We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e. evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non-prohibitive costs in different states. In such...

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even...

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the suc- cessive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable...

We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We de?ne dynamic mono- tonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost suf?cient for repeated...

Group identification refers to the problem of classifying individuals into groups (e.g., racial or ethnic classification). We consider a multinary group identification model where memberships to three or more groups are simultaneously determined based on individual opinions on who belong to what...