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Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions : complete characterization

Xiong, Siyang - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 1, pp. 197-230

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014245406

Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games

Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1055-1093

In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite‐player games have strict pure strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806369

Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk

Balbus, Lukasz; Dziewulski, Pawel; Reffett, Kevin L.; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 725-762

We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273776

Interim correlated rationalizability

Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 1, pp. 15-40

characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702628

Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability

Ely, Jeffrey C.; Peski, Marcin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 1, pp. 19-65

In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descriptions of the players' information for the purposes of determining a player's behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution concepts. We then investigate what is essential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704466

Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté

Heifetz, Aviad; Kets, Willemien - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 415-465

Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that no refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855899

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Fudenberg, Drew; Kamada, Yuichiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 775-806

extensive-form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673255

Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game

Sandholm, William H.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1347-1385

We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the Centipede game, these best experienced...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158817

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact … attach to (n- 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when λn is above an … appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λn converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030

Robust scoring rules

Tsakas, Elias - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 3, pp. 955-987

Is it possible to guarantee that the mere exposure of a subject to a belief elicitation task will not affect the very same beliefs that we are trying to elicit? In this paper, we introduce mechanisms that make it simultaneously strictly dominant for the subject (a) not to acquire any information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308719