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Forward induction reasoning revisited
Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Friedenberg, Amanda - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 1, pp. 57-98
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as "rationality and common strong … belief of rationality" (RCSBR). Here, we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690929
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Interim correlated rationalizability
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 1, pp. 15-40
characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702628
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Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability
Ely, Jeffrey C.; Peski, Marcin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 1, pp. 19-65
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descriptions of the players' information for the purposes of determining a player's behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution concepts. We then investigate what is essential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704466
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Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
Sandholm, William H.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1347-1385
We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the Centipede game, these best experienced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158817
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Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information
Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122
unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact … attach to (n- 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when λn is above an … appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λn converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030
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Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
Balbus, Lukasz; Dziewulski, Pawel; Reffett, Kevin L.; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 725-762
We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273776
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Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games
Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1055-1093
In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite‐player games have strict pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806369
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Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 511-544
This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308444
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A model of choice from lists
Rubinstein, Ariel; Salant, Yuval - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 1, pp. 3-17
The standard economic choice model assumes that the decision maker chooses from <i>sets</i> of alternatives. In contrast, we analyze a choice model in which the decision maker encounters the alternatives in the form of a <i>list</i>. We present two axioms similar in nature to the classical axioms of choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704472
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List-rationalizable choice
Yıldız, Kemal - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 587-599
the formulation of list rationality to stochastic choice setup. We say two alternatives are related if the \textit …. By using this characterization, we relate list rationality to two-stage choice procedures. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672005