Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation … delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning … discuss implications on learning delegation for distinct organizations. …

I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private … signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning … unbounded strength there is learning in a strong sense: agents' actions are ex-post optimal given both the state of the world …

We study learning and information acquisition by a Bayesian agent whose prior belief is misspecified in the sense that …

the (possibly misspecified) prior belief that her local network is the entire network. We present a tractable learning … rule to implement such locally Bayesian learning: each agent extracts new information using the full history of observed …

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic … situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning … in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close …