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Interim correlated rationalizability
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 1, pp. 15-40
characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702628
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Subjective expected utility in games
Di Tillio, Alfredo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 3, pp. 287-323
This paper extends Savage's subjective approach to probability and utility from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic environments. Interactive uncertainty is modeled both explicitly, using hierarchies of preference relations, the analogue of beliefs hierarchies,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700273
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Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
Sandholm, William H.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1347-1385
We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the Centipede game, these best experienced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158817
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Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information
Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122
unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact … attach to (n- 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when λn is above an … appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λn converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030
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Forward induction reasoning revisited
Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Friedenberg, Amanda - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 1, pp. 57-98
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as "rationality and common strong … belief of rationality" (RCSBR). Here, we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690929
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Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability
Ely, Jeffrey C.; Peski, Marcin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 1, pp. 19-65
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descriptions of the players' information for the purposes of determining a player's behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution concepts. We then investigate what is essential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704466
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Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 511-544
This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308444
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Topologies on types
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 275-309
We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703019
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Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium : a framework for robust predictions
Esponda, Ignacio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 467-501
I introduce a new framework to study environments with both structural and strategic uncertainty, different from Harsanyi's (1967-8) `Bayesian games', that allows a researcher to test the robustness of Nash predictions while maintaining certain desirable restrictions on players' beliefs. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686678
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von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 3, pp. 499-521
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691082