Similar Search Results

On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions

Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 41-52

When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with … complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be … perceived as unfair since there are bidders willing to pay more than the winners' payments. Moreover, non-core outcomes render …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673080

Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions

Manzano Tovar, Carolina; Vives, Xavier - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1095-1137

We analyze a divisible good uniform‐price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear‐quadratic‐normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806389

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132

Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons

Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 927-970

We study directed search equilibria in a decentralized market with adverse selection, where uninformed buyers post general trading mechanisms and informed sellers select one of them. We show that this has differing and significant implications with respect to the traditional approach, based on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104602

On asymmetric reserve prices

Kotowski, Maciej H. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 205-237

We investigate equilibrium bidding in first-price auctions with asymmetric reserve prices. For example, the auctioneer may set a low reserve price for one subset of bidders and a high reserve price for others. When used to pursue a distributional objective, lowering the reserve price for some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855864

Inefficient rushes in auctions

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306

We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855888

A common-value auction with state-dependent participation

Lauermann, Stephan; Wolinsky, Asher - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 841-881

This paper analyzes a common-value, first-price auction with state-dependent participation. The number of bidders, which is unobservable to them, depends on the true value. For participation patterns with many bidders in each state, the bidding equilibrium may be of a "pooling" type - with high...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273782

A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation‐based tâtonnement

Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 943-978

The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806306

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of biddersâ€™ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457

Information aggregation in competitive markets

Siga, Lucas; Mihm, Maximilian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 1, pp. 161-196

We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information---the betweenness property---that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415617

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last