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On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions

Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 41-52

When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with … complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be … perceived as unfair since there are bidders willing to pay more than the winners' payments. Moreover, non-core outcomes render …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673080

Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

Bikhchandani, Sushil - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 369-393

We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702816

Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget

Burkett, Justin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 133-155

I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation mechanism). I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the principal's beliefs about the value of the item for a simple budget constraint to be the optimal contract. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673069

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132

Information aggregation in competitive markets

Siga, Lucas; Mihm, Maximilian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 1, pp. 161-196

We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information---the betweenness property---that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415617

Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions

Manzano Tovar, Carolina; Vives, Xavier - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1095-1137

We analyze a divisible good uniform‐price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear‐quadratic‐normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806389

Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions

Barelli, Paulo; Govindan, Srihari - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 565-582

We provide a shorter proof of the main result in Reny and Perry (2006, Econometrica) by establishing a lower semicontinuity property of auctions as the number of traders goes to infinity, leveraging existence of equilibria in the limit auction. Our proof also eliminates two of the assumptions in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576684

Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information

Deng, Shanglyu; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 705-742

This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete-information, all-pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize. They observe the efforts made by their earlier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576711

Auction design with data-driven misspecifications : inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation

Jehiel, Philippe; Mierendorff, Konrad - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 4, pp. 1543-1579

We study the existence of efficient auctions in private value settings in which some bidders form their expectations about the distribution of their competitor's bids based on the accessible data from past similar auctions consisting of bids and ex post values. We consider steady states in such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135356

Auction design in the presence of collusion

Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 3, pp. 383-429

We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for extracting payments from the agents in such a situation are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700241