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The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games, which admit no equilibrium … (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1977, 1999) but …-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches in full implementation theory. We show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472500
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308627
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576714
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996
of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in Nash … equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice … functions and investigate the connections with dominant strategy implementation and robust implementation. We show that in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702527
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689095
Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415641
Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806463
In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744271
In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689054