We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey (J Econ Behav Organ 8:137–144, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">1987</CitationRef>). In a 2 <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\times $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mo>×</mo> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> 2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey (<CitationRef CitationID="CR16">1987</CitationRef>). Our results...</citationref></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></citationref>

We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame. In one treatment, responders’ reactions are hidden to proposers. We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders’ intrinsic resistance to unfairness. In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing...