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Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods

Dehez, Pierre - In: Theory and Decision 74 (2013) 1, pp. 13-29

A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good that each of its members is able to provide at a certain cost. The solution is to rely on the member who can provide the public good at the lowest cost, with a due compensation from the other members. This problem has been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988746

Equivalent comparisons of information channels

Nakata, Hiroyuki - In: Theory and Decision 71 (2011) 4, pp. 559-574

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009327396

The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power

Felsenthal, Dan; Machover, Moshé; Zwicker, William - In: Theory and Decision 44 (1998) 1, pp. 83-116

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401890

Axiomatization of a class of share functions for n-person games

Laan, Gerard van der; Brink, René van den - In: Theory and Decision 44 (1998) 2, pp. 117-148

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401919

Values with exogenous payments

Wiese, Harald - In: Theory and Decision 72 (2012) 4, pp. 485-508

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010865848

Constrained egalitarianism in a simple redistributive model

Jaffray, Jean-Yves; Mongin, Philippe - In: Theory and Decision 54 (2003) 1, pp. 33-56

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710955

Digraph Competitions and Cooperative Games

Brink, René van den; Borm, Peter - In: Theory and Decision 53 (2002) 4, pp. 327-342

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005809737

A comparison of non-transferable utility values

Hart, Sergiu - In: Theory and Decision 56 (2004) 1, pp. 35-46

Three values for non-transferable utility games -- the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler--Owen consistent NTU-value -- are compared in a simple example. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005542802

A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure

Huettner, Frank - In: Theory and Decision 78 (2015) 2, pp. 273-287

We introduce a solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility and a coalition structure that is proportional for two-player games. Our value is obtained from generalizing a proportional value for cooperative games with transferable utility (Ortmann <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2000</CitationRef>) in a way that parallels...</citationref>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154913